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Neoliberalism, the Rise of New Media Folklore 
and the Emergence of New Nationalisms1
Jan Kajfosz2
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to define the difference between nationalisms of 
the modern era and contemporary nationalisms. The proposition is methodolog-
ically based on the phenomenological and semiotic analysis of texts represent-
ing genres of new media folklore shared within digital communicative networks 
as well as on the analysis of conditions of their production, consumption, and 
reproduction. The author claims that the social reproduction of new national-
isms takes place beyond traditional (modern) social structures and hierarchies of 
knowledge credibility. He attempts to prove that new nationalisms are based on 
magical-mythical perception and thinking.
The aim of the paper is to answer the question what conditions shape the contemporary social production and reproduction of national-
ism compared to the era of modernity. During the 1960s, Peter L. Berg-
er and Thomas Luckmann describe the social mechanisms of produc-
tion of collectively relevant meanings in their classical work, The Social 
Construction of Reality3. According to these authors the legitimization of 
knowledge and of social institutions happens on four layers: 1) every-
day vocabulary (habitual connotations of every understandable word 
1 This paper has been financially supported by University of Ostrava, Insti-
tutional Development Project (IRP) No. 201819 Social and Cultural Mecha-
nisms of In- and Exclusion: a Comparative Perspective.
2 Jan Kajfosz is Associate Professor at the Institute of Ethnology and Cultur-
al Anthropology, University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland) and at the De-
partment of Sociology, University of Ostrava (Czech Republic). His research 
interests concern the cognitive prerequisites of reification, social constructiv-
ism and pragmatic aspects of communication. Among his numerous publi-
cations, the most recent are, Return to the beginnings, or how culture masks 
its changes? (2015) and Presuppositions within the analysis of popular mem-
ory discourses (2018).
3 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: A 
treatise in the sociology of knowledge (New York and London: Doubleday, 1989)
Berlin Journal of Critical Theory  |  Vol. 3, No. 2 (April, 2019)28
reproduce a value system and implicate an instruction on how to act to-
wards designated phenomena and what to expect from them), 2) simple 
explanatory patterns in the form of generalizing judgments and popular 
narratives (proverbs, legends, rumors, gossips, etc.), 3) expert knowledge 
and argumentation, which is sometimes not accessible outside of expert 
systems;  the reproduction of such knowledge requires special initiating 
techniques and rituals, 4) a symbolical universe consisting of signs able 
to unify disparate phenomena into one perceived “order of things.” – The 
authors claim that when expert knowledge is not immediately accessible 
for non-experts, popular representations of such knowledge in the form 
of suitable hierarchies of symbols and narratives can make them legiti-
mate. By means of reduced and aestheticized representations of expert 
knowledge members of different societies can also understand incom-
prehensible phenomena in such a way that they feel their grandeur and 
usefulness for the society or even mankind, even if they cannot always 
justify their feelings4. – This all relates to the era of modernity.
Within the contemporary social production of collectively relevant 
sense, the importance of layer 3 and 4 decreases in favor of layer 2. The re-
production of credibility of modern knowledge institutions is disturbed 
to a large extent due to new communication technologies (the emergence 
of new media and social media), due to neoliberal patterns of trading in-
formation (the emergence of infotainment) and due to social media folk-
lore as a sphere of everyday collective prosumption (production as well 
as consumption) beyond modern social hierarchies, and also beyond the 
constraints of long-time authorities. The production of contemporary 
nationalism happens to a large extent beyond the classical ideological 
4 Roland Barthes demonstrates this type of magical-mythical legitimization 
with the example of Einstein´s equations. Even non-physicists can under-
stand E=mc2 in such a way that they perceive it as an „esoteric image of a sci-
ence entirely contained in a few letters“. The equation can be spontaneously 
seen as a sign of a „secret of the world“. I can be seen as a sign of an inacces-
sible knowledge and in this sense it can be perfectly understandable. Roland 
Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Jonathan Cape (New York: The Noonday Press, 
1972), 69-70.
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state apparatuses, if we are to use the notion of Louis Althusser5. The 
essential feature of new nationalisms consists in the fact that they are not 
embedded in former, modern hierarchies of knowledge credibility any-
more. Nowadays it is hardly possible to legitimize institutions of knowl-
edge and knowledge as such only by means of consensual acknowledged 
symbols and rituals or by means of symbiotic or mutual “consecration” 
of cooperating authorities (established information sources) in the sense 
proposed by Pierre Bourdieu6.
The contemporary world under the aspect of 
knowledge credibility hierarchies
Within the former modern society, if somebody acknowledges a publisher 
as a credible knowledge institution, he will presumably acknowledge a 
different publisher due to the fact a word (a name) having specific conno-
tations – implicating specific images and values – transfering them onto 
every entity to which it indexically relates. Designation means i.a. using 
generalizing maps which make invisible various changes, discontinuities 
and all specifics of territories to which such maps relate7. Within modern 
society, even if somebody distinguishes between more and less credible 
publishers he will apparently tend to believe that what is published is 
more credible than what is said, except anomic circumstances when credi-
bility hierarchies change. In the world of modernity, a recognized cooper-
ation between a credible publisher and an author who has been unknown 
so far can make the author credible – or vice versa, if a credible author has 
something in common with a new publisher, he/she can make the pub-
5 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and ideological state apparatusses (notes towards an 
investigation)’, in Lenin and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York and 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 86-127.
6 Pierre Bourdieu, Kunst und Kultur: Zur Ökonomie der symbolischen Güter, 
trans. Hella Beister (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014), 98-117.
7 Alfred Korzybski, Science and sanity: An introduction to the non-Aristotelian sys-
tems and general semantics (New York: Institute of General Semantics, 2000), 
58; compare Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and simulation, trans. Sheila F. Glaser 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).
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lisher trustworthy and prominent. Within spontaneous perception index-
icalities (perceived contiguities) between two institutions can change in 
their similarity or even identity under some aspects: one institution makes 
other institutions credible if it has something in common with them. Our 
credible companionship makes us credible and our noncredible compan-
ionship makes us not credible. This way, an institution, which has a good 
reputation can transfer this reputation to other institutions due to their co-
operation. If third parties perceive such cooperation as not accidental, they 
easily assume that both institutions enjoy similar prestige. In this way, au-
thors can make their publishers, broadcasters or even the universities cred-
ible, where they had studied, where they had taught etc. – and vice versa8.
In the same way, not only credible  hierarchies of knowledge institu-
tions but also credible  hierarchies of narratives are produced in modern 
society. Within a pre-reflexive, spontaneous perception, the value is trans-
ferred from the source of a narrative onto the narrative, and this occurs 
again on the basis of an indexical relation, on the basis of the perceived 
contiguity of one and the other. Let us look at the matter from the per-
spective of pupils at school: the teacher, who is telling them a story is for 
them a metonymic representative of the school; the school is a metonym-
ic representative of education, and as it follows, of objective knowledge. 
One and the other are, in turn, metonymically related to initiation rituals 
(entrance examinations, graduations), which provide the pupil with lofty 
– “sacred” – experiences, etc. Most importantly, the value-bearing con-
notations connected with one link of the metonymic chain can be trans-
ferred to another link and vice versa. The loftiness or authority (and other 
axiologically characterized connotations) metonymically connected with 
the institution of the school are ‘transferred’ to the teacher, and from him 
back to the school, and so on. They are also transferred to the stories the 
teacher presents to his/her students, and vice versa. In this precise man-
ner, narratives can be legitimized by themselves; they can also legitimize 
social institutions, including those by which they were produced9.
8 Bourdieu, 2014, 98-117.
9 Compare Jan Kajfosz, ‚Magic in the social construction of the past: The case 
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The teacher, whose authority is transferred to the narrative he trans-
mits, can be replaced by a museum guide, or by a grandfather, parents, 
other family members and friends (significant others) who constitute 
authority for the recipient and to whom the recipient is emotionally at-
tached. Other similar sources which are able to make their messages cred-
ible are acknowledged newspapers, broadcasters etc. The value-bearing 
connotation connected with any object can be transferred onto the story 
that is associated with it and the opposite. To repeat: an axiological val-
uation – positive or negative – associated with the sources of narratives 
can be transferred to those narratives (making them credible or noncred-
ible) and from them back again to their sources. In this way, every society 
produces and reproduces its picture of the world.
Within relatively stable hierarchies of credibility, expert knowledge 
– not accessible from the outside of expert systems – can be quite easily 
legitimized by symbolical universes. Within neoliberal postmodernity, 
this does not seem possible anymore. Neoliberal knowledge institutions 
can reproduce their symbolic capitals and survive on the free market 
only in the way of permanent “fighting” for wide audiences – in the 
way of entertaining, surprising, astonishing, amazing them. If they do 
not offer any visible technologies generally regarded as useful, the only 
way a knowledge institution can establish reasons for its own existence 
is to make spectators wonder. In such circumstances only evoking “emo-
tional” astonishment has the power to persuade. Rhetorical strategies 
– communication styles of marketing and PR – overwhelm the Aristo-
telian syllogism within the public discourses. This can be regarded as 
a consequence of the fact that modern hierarchies of knowledge have 
collapsed. Long-term authorities have been to a large extent replaced by 
short-term authorities (movie stars and other celebrities as experts, blog-
gers, YouTubers etc.), who are characterized by the lack of need to avoid 
contradictions and to maintain consistencies of knowledge. Moreover, 
the virtual significant others (mediated people we are emotionally at-
tached to) can change very quickly: the valuable authority of today can 
of Teschen Silesia,’ Polish Sociological Review, 2013, 183: 357-358.
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be quickly removed and replaced by another one. Credible hierarchies of 
knowledge institutions are in so far unstable, that they probably do not 
exist anymore if they are defined through their stability.
Within the sphere of neoliberal media, the credibility of broadcasters 
is not necessarily a condition of their popularity, of their symbolic capital 
and of their profits. This can be demonstrated in many examples:
2012 Animal Planet and Discovery Channel – which are globally con-
sidered recognized educational broadcasters – aired the mockumentary 
entitled Mermaids: The Body Found (2011, director: Sid Bennett). The nar-
rative about allegedly concealed, but really existent mermaids (reported 
as aquatic apes occasionally observed by navy members and scientists) 
was inscribed into the narrative about Darwin’s evolution. This was the 
essential discursive figure of the message. This way, value and credibility 
associated with the theory about the origin of species were transferred to 
the story about mermaids, making them possibly real. In other words: 
contiguity (connection) between these two narratives made them similar 
under the aspect of their modality. The truthfulness of one story was 
transferred to the other one, making the existence of mermaids plausi-
ble. Also, the credibility of the broadcasters was transferred to the story, 
making “filmed” mermaids real. Reactions posted on the discussion fo-
rum of the broadcasters showed that many recipients were truly fooled, 
others got very angry:10
 (…) I find your cavalier attitude and disregard for those of us of 
whom may have been longtime fans, to be egregious. Some people in 
this crazy world still seek the truth. You are every bit as irresponsible 
as those fools who aired WAR OF WORLDS. I am no longer a sub-
scriber. You idiots. Good Bye Animal Planet.
Very disappointed in The Discovery Channel with this “documen-
tary”. Really, really bad decision to air garbage. Not what I would 
expect from this network.
10 Accessed: http://animal.discovery.com/tv-shows/other/videos/mermaids.
htm (26-09-2012)
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Shame on you Discovery Channel. I am about to completely turn my 
back on Discovery and never watch your channel again. (…) Shame 
on you for treating your viewers like idiots!!!
Really sad.... In my opinion, the only FEW television channels you 
COULD TRUST TO BE TRUE, were the Discovery Channel, His-
tory Chnl., and Ntl. Geo. Now, I hesitate to trust any of them. This 
was a huge mistake, not stating it was FICTION!! 
Can we get back to science and stop injecting sci-fi into, what should 
be educational (?)
We can find similar discursive figures (manipulation techniques) in many 
other programs of broadcasters associated with educational and scientif-
ic discourses, e.g. Ancient X-files, aired by the National Geographic Channel, 
Lost Tapes, aired by Animal Planet etc. The attempts to make documenta-
ries or docudramas attractive through mysteries can be demonstrated on 
the series Mayday (or: Air Crash Investigation)  from the Canadian compa-
ny Cineflix. In Episode 8 (titled Fatal Distraction), Season 5, there appears 
an undeclared urban legend regarding ghosts protecting planes11 as a 
component narrative. The docudrama contains the following story: in 
the disaster of flight 401 in the Everglades Swamp two pilots were killed. 
Parts of the plane that crashed were reused in other aircrafts. Whenever 
they are in the air and face possible danger, the ghosts of these two dead 
pilots allegedly appear on board to warn the crew and in this way keep 
everyone safe. Reconstructed scientific investigations of the airplane 
crash made the story about ghosts credible in the eyes of some recipients. 
Without trying to decide in any way, what was real and what was not, 
we can say that the boundless struggle for  public attention undermined 
to a large extent consensual differences between probability and improb-
ability. It undermined the stability of socially shared background pieces 
of knowledge.
11 Compare John G. Fuller, The Ghost of Flight 401 (North Hobart: Hear a Book, 
1987)
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The dominating infotainment discourses are as astonishing as well as 
mystifying (“fooling”). Considering the War of the Worlds, a radio drama 
from 1938 about an invasion from Mars12, which was due to its rhetoric 
figures perceived by many listeners as a message reporting real events, 
we cannot precisely determine, when the credibility of free mass infor-
mation institutions started to collapse. It is a question of frequency of 
comparable hybrid genres in media. Only in the world of relatively sta-
ble background knowledge, can mockumentaries encourage their con-
sumers to think critically and to learn how to detect rhetoric strategies. 
The frequent occurrence of such genres everywhere makes such back-
ground knowledge including the hierarchies of sources credibility very 
unstable. Mockumentaries produce the assumption any message could 
be true or fake and there are no criteria of its reliability. Mockumentaries, 
as well as all other fake news, generate profits because popularity by 
itself generates profit (e.g. on Youtube). There is no crucial difference be-
tween contemporary media as such and social media under this aspect.
Early modern society also knew hoaxes, mercantile legends as well 
as trolling in the sense of intended manipulation and mystifying for dif-
ferent purposes13. However, nowadays there is one phenomenon which 
is new: the difference between consensually recognized credible and 
non  credible information sources has almost disappeared. Supremacy of 
rhetoric strategies in contemporary new media seems to be the answer to 
the question why neoliberal society does not reproduce the early modern 
difference between “noble” and “ignoble” media and styles of communi-
cation anymore. Fooling and being fooled, disseminating ignorance and 
being ignorant do not seem to discredit anybody anymore. The slogan 
anything goes! as a wish of 20th-century postmodernists has become re-
ality. This way the culture of mystification and of shared hysteria is the 
essential circumstance of the emergence of new nationalisms.
12 It was an adaptation of a science fiction novel with the same title written by 
Herbert G. Wells.
13 Compare Francis Wheen, How mumbo-jumbo conquered the world: A short histo-
ry of modern delusions (London: Fourth Estate, 2004); Francis Wheen, Strange 
days indeed: The golden age of paranoia (London: Fourth Estate, 2010)
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If we are to consider notions like “alternative facts” (a famous expres-
sion of Kellyanne Conway, counselor to the president in the administra-
tion of U.S.) or “fake media” (Donald Trump labels by this term any un-
comfortable broadcasters) as legitimate rhetoric tools of neoliberal state 
institutions, another new phenomenon appears: Western political insti-
tutions have started to use fake information (unproven, fabricated and 
easily falsifiable knowledge), as well as mystifying accusations of dis-
seminating fake information, as legitimate tools of political competition. 
In this manner, the neoliberal Western state has given up the attempt 
to reproduce credibility of its own institutions as well as the attempt to 
reproduce symbolical universes, which would be able to unify different 
phenomena in integral and credible orders. This is another symptom of 
progressive destruction (not deconstruction!) of knowledge credibili-
ty hierarchies. Generalizing, confusing, mystifying, accusing acknowl-
edged fact-finding institutions of deception, these have all started to be 
considered legitimate. Crossing red lines without any social consequenc-
es encourages other comparable subjects to do so.
If one acknowledged institution argues there is no global warming 
caused by man and another one argues there is such warming, why 
should Eastern Europeans and others not believe the attractive folklore 
narratives that refugees from Syria or Iraq are a perfectly organised 
body – controlled and encouraged from a hidden center – with one con-
sequent long-time mission: to make, step by step all of Europe Islamic. 
Not only due to a credibility crisis but also due to folklorization of the 
public sphere, conspiracy theories start to work as a legitimate tool of 
political competition. Within conspiracy theories in Eastern Europe, we 
can observe an interesting assumption: the hostile Other is not necessary 
somewhere “there” (behind the state border), it is among us, pretending 
to be the Own and trying to destroy the Own from inside, such as hidden 
or apparent Jews (e.g. Georg Soros considered by some Hungarians to be 
the enemy of the state) or hidden or apparent Moslems (e.g. Barack Hus-
sein Obama who, according to some inhabitants of Eastern Europe, was 
not even born in the USA). The popularity of conspiracy theories within 
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the social media folklore creation reveal something deeply true: firstly, 
modern hierarchies of knowledge credibility have crumbled, secondly, 
the culture of uncertainty, mistrust, and vulnerability against mystifica-
tion is at least partially the result of marketing of fear, which is based on 
the principle that naivety, fear, and superstition can generate significant 
political and economic profits14.
Folklorized nationalisms are products of the so-called post-truth era 
(postfaktisches Zeitalter). Crucial for their emergence is the culture of un-
certainty, of collective hysteria production and its instrumentalization 
for short-time political and economic purposes. Neoliberal ideology – as 
a sphere of cognitive and acting habitus – means i.a. broad social accep-
tance for economically as well as politically motivated instrumentaliza-
tion of people’s feelings (e.g. fears, collectively shared hysterias), beliefs, 
collective memories, values, symbols. The management of long-term 
consequences of such instrumentalizations, the responsibility for long-
term damages is very often delegated to “others”.
New nationalisms can be defined at least by three interrelated features:
1. They are “folklorized” in such a way that their production is to a 
large extent interactive, spontaneous and aestheticized.
2. They are dominated by magic-mythical perception and thinking.
3. The spontaneity of nationalism production and reproduction within 
the folklore creation can be manipulated by accidental or profes-
sional trolling.
Folklorization of contemporary nationalisms
Social media are at least partially responsible for the disappearance of 
the modern difference between “noble” and “ignoble”. Posting highly ir-
rational and irresponsible tweets (irresponsible due to their consequenc-
es for the integrity of the society) by people recognized as celebrities re-
veal the fact that no statement can make somebody socially ostracized 
for a long time. Here, again, the slogan “anything goes!” can be applied. 
14 Compare Umberto Eco, Turning back the clock: Hot wars and media populism 
(London: Vintage Digital, 2014)
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Within the social media, a new communication convention emerged, 
where no statement can make its sender scandalous, disgraceful or dis-
gusting for a longer period of time. Emotions break out and expire, what 
stays is the shift of red lines. This makes everything socially acceptable 
as long as it does not interfere with the law. The law applies here as the 
only criterion of social regulation. Within some milieus of Polish social 
media, breaking rules of consensual rationality starts to work as a kind 
of protest against political correctness and as a mean of defining oneself 
against liberal and leftist “elites” associated with the Other – e.g. with 
Jews and Germans from abroad or alleged “hidden” Jews and Germans 
from the home country. Here we can detect a significant shift between 
the Own and the Other. Who does not identify himself with a set of ideas 
standing for “national culture” can be in contemporary Polish right-wing 
milieu recognized as a “foreigner”, although not yet proven “foreigner”. 
Thus, national belonging starts to be defined through one’s political con-
victions.
Concerning the notion of folklore, we can draw on Peter G. Bogatyrev 
and R. Jakobson. These scholars define folklore as a poetical text aimed at 
la langue15. Such texts are popular. They are broadly reproduced, or their 
semantic structures are broadly reproduced, within a larger or smaller 
communicative society, within a special social group or – what seems to 
be the most decisive point for the rise of new nationalisms – within a dig-
ital communication network. If we claim that folklore texts (all folklore 
genres) fulfill a poetical function, it means they are aestheticized in such 
a manner that they can arouse intense feelings among its bearers, they 
are attractive. Folklore creation is always a sphere of spontaneous so-
cial prosumption as well as a sphere of infotainment. Shared statements 
must be always attractive in some aspects. 
Folklore works as an instrument of maintaining shared beliefs, val-
ue systems, stereotypes, conceptual scenarios, expectations or attitudes. 
As stated by Antonio Gramsci, folklore is an instrument of hegemony, a 
15 Peter G. Bogatyrev and Roman Jakobson, ‘Folklore as a special form of creation,’ 
in R. Jakobson: Selected Writings, vol. IV (The Hague: Mouton, 1966), 1-15.
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means of ideology reproduction16. Folklore is responsible for the obvi-
ousness of the life-world. Drawing on Bogatyrev and Jakobson, folklore 
has evolutionary character, it changes according to changing social, cul-
tural and political needs. It adapts to changing circumstances. Every era 
and every environment has its own folklore.
According to Bogatyrev and Jakobson, folklore creation is character-
ized by the so-called preventive censorship. If a statement does not meet 
the conceptual capacities of the receiver, he will not reproduce (not share) 
it. A message which does not meet mental images, semantic structures, 
needs and expectations of members of a communication network, will 
not stay in circulation. Within the social circulation, an original message 
can unnoticeably change according to actual social demands. Something 
gets forgotten, concealed or exaggerated. In this manner, communication 
society can make a mountain out of a molehill – and vice versa. Concern-
ing the folklore creation, the output message must always „make sense”, 
however, it can considerably differ from the input message. Some mean-
ings are disappearing, some others are being borrowed from collective 
mythologies17. If the sender wants to be sure to reach his recipients, he 
must use the style of slogans, catchwords, watchwords, sayings, short 
expressions. Within the folklore creation which engages its bearers, the 
need for easily accessible sense is always stronger than for any critical 
reflection.
To take verbal jokes as an example, they can be humorous only for 
people sharing some obvious or background knowledge, e.g.: An Arab 
sits in a plane to New York. A stewardess asks him: „Something to drink?” 
– „No, I will drive in a while.” – This joke could be considered not very 
consistent (Moslems usually do not drink alcohol) and not suitable at 
least in some circumstances of face-to-face communication. As soon as it 
transforms into an internet joke, e.g. into a visual joke functioning as an 
internet meme (demotivator), it can spread more easily and reproduce 
16 Antonio Gramsci, Gefängnishefte. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. vol. 6. Philosophie 
der Praxis. Hefte 10 und 11 (Hamburg: Argument, 1994), 1375.
17 Compare Barthes, 1972.
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the associative link (or: implicit conceptual action scenario) between Arab 
and terrorism more effectively. In another situation, this associative link 
strengthened in this fashion will determine the reading of other texts. 
This way, even jokes can support beliefs. One belief makes possible an-
other one in such a way that it functions as an assumption making sim-
ilar assumptions passable and plausible. A believed and never falsified 
hoax makes people vulnerable against similar hoaxes and other genres 
of collective hysteria. People easily believe something if it corresponds 
to collectively shared images. If we believe others believe something, it 
seems there must be at least some truth about it. Let us be reminded of 
the sentence of William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas: „If men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences”18. – If folklore unites 
heterogeneous groups of people under one notion (one sign) associated 
with danger and hostility, our attitudes towards everybody recognized 
by means of this notion will be violent and will provoke violence. In this 
manner, folklore genres can function as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Collective phantasies have performative (perlocutive) power in the sense 
that they can become reality, they can create real facts.
Back to the point. Folklore created beliefs in pre-modern and modern 
society as well, although within relatively stable hierarchies of knowledge 
credibility. In a neoliberal society determined by contemporary social 
media, its ability to create facts seems to be almost limitless19. Convergent 
folklore genres (contemporary myths, conspiracy theories, etc.), as well 
as parafolklore hybrid genres, have dominated social media. Folklore 
texts must be always comprehensible and fulfill poetic functions. They 
entertain, amaze, frighten, they make people laugh. New nationalisms 
reproduced by means of social media folklore are highly aestheticized – 
they arouse intense feelings – and reproduce in a very spontaneous way.
18 William I. Thomas and Dorothy S. Thomas, The child in America: Behavior 
problems and programs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 571-572.
19 Even some young Wahabi fanatics in the West can be regarded as „victims” 
of religious folklore which aestheticizes violence and functions outside of 
hierarchies of knowledge credibility – outside of the system of Islamic theo-
logical institutions.
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Zygmunt Bauman claims social media (Facebook etc.) enable their 
participant to “filter out” all subjects and their messages, which are 
incompatible with his/her own opinions and expectations. He/she can 
choose what people and what ideas he/she wants to face too. However 
there is a need for one short addendum: it is rather impossible to assume 
opinions and expectations of such participants to be consistent, without 
any discrepancies, paradoxes or antinomies. Production and reproduc-
tion of sense within social media – also in form of folklore genres – re-
sembles acting in everyday situations off-line. Here applies the utterance 
of Alfred Schütz: “The actor within the social world, however, experiences it 
primarily as a field of his actual and possible acts and only secondarily as an 
object of his thinking. In so far as he is interested in knowledge of his social 
world, he organizes this knowledge not in terms of a scientific system but in 
terms of relevance to his actions.”20 One conspiracy theory can support the 
other one even if the first contradicts the other one. In different contexts, 
different things are believed.
Magical-mythical thinking within contemporary nationalisms
Due to the need for defining notions and their binding use as well as 
to the need for the precision of concluding, it is possible to distinguish 
between two discourse models: an analytical (Aristotelian) and a mag-
ical-mythical one. The latter type of the discourse is based on connota-
tions and free associations able to lead from any idea to another one. Let 
us demonstrate it on the Internet users’ discussions to the article „Zyg-
munt Bauman w „El País”: mamy do czynienia z kryzysem demokracji [Zyg-
munt Bauman in “El País”: We face democracy crisis]”21. It was published 
on 26 January 2016 by a popular Polish information portal Onet.pl. The 
text deals with Zygmunt Bauman’s opinions concerning the condition 
of democracy in the world dominated by social media. I followed the 
20 Alfred Schuetz, ‘The stranger: An essay in social psychology,’ American Jour-
nal of Sociology, 1944, 49.6: 499-507.
21 Accessed: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/zygmunt-bauman-w-el-pais-ma-
my-do-czynienia-z-kryzysem-demokacji/p6vbe4 (01-02-2016)
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statements of  internet users posted in the discussion forum related to the 
article during the first days after its release.
If we examine the messages posted immediately after the article had 
been published, only a few posts address the sociologist’s claims, even if 
very generally (likes and dislikes). The overwhelming majority of posts 
deals with the author’s Jewishness and his communist past. They should 
be not considered as usual argumenta ad hominem known from every text-
book of rhetoric. It is something more: a manifestation of habitus devel-
oped within the social media communication and related to folklorized 
nationalism.
The aforementioned internet article for many of its interactive read-
ers is only a point of departure for the reproduction of a shared set of 
mythical narratives and their shortened representations. They need to be 
recalled and confirmed again and again, in a somehow obsessive way. 
The narratives reproduce the same structure: the hostile Others (Jews, 
communists, leftists, etc.) have been always harming the Own in the same 
way from the beginning and will do the same to the very end. The Other 
was never the Own and cannot be the Own in any way – this distinction 
is eternal and absolute. Even if somebody sharply disagrees with such 
ideas, for them they are the very topic of the discussion. It is not even 
a discussion consisting of syllogisms. The arguing is based on connota-
tions22. They allow “jumping” from one point to another as well as blend-
ing everything with everything. Discussions within such a discourse al-
ways lead to the same set of topics and images regardless of their points 
22 Roland Barthes calls connotation a myth. The imperceptible connotation can 
‘blend’ with the phenomenon accompanying it. Connotation makes it possi-
ble that different phenomena blend in one magical unity of meaning, just as 
in the spontaneous experience the de Saussuresque signifier merges with the 
signified (the signifiant with the signifié), or the word merges with its object 
for as long as a person, in abstracting from his experiences, does not distin-
guish one from the other and does not notice that a word (sign) can help 
form or even produce its object. Barthes considers the invisible connotation 
to be a figure of myth on account of its ability to create a clear, easily legible, 
obvious world. In this context, what is particularly important is that the con-
notation, employed instrumentally, is able to legitimize literally everything 
(Barthes, 1972, 110-113).
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of departure. They induce the confirmation of the difference between Us 
and Them, which functions as a kind of collective obsession. It reminds 
us somehow of free associations as a psychoanalytical category where 
random starting means leading someone, sooner or later, to the same 
repertoire of obsessional images – to the same repertoire of idées fixes. If 
such a discourse dominates the forum, it devastates any debate.
As stated, the “discussion” I followed was completely irrelevant re-
garding the content of the article. Acquaintance with Zygmunt Bau-
man’s propositions contained in the message was not a prerequisite for 
posting opinions. Regarding the analysed posts of internet users, the 
appearance of such an article functioned as a kind of “starter” of collec-
tive imagination by means of a chain of habitual metonymies (based on 
perceived contiguities) and metaphors (based on perceived similarities). 
Such imagination always leads to the same result: to the confirmation of 
a highly emotional and obsessive set of ideas.
Considering many posts, Bauman represents Jews as well as Russians 
and Germans under the aspect of their alleged hostility against Poles. At 
the same time, he represents communists, leftists, and even Nazis. Within 
the magical-mythical discourse, such thinking cannot be recognized as 
inconsistent. This kind of associative concluding is a symptom of sym-
pathetic magic: different phenomena, connected in any kind of way, are 
similar, and thus at least under some aspects identical23. The crucial fea-
ture of magical-mythical thinking is an assumption of the permanence 
of signs and of the reality they are related to – in the sense of the saying 
“there’s nothing new under the sun”. There is no room for any expi-
rations (e.g. “Czerwone zawsze będzie czerwone, nawet jak będzie przema-
lowane. Stary komuch.” [“Red will be forever red, even if painted over. 
An old communist.”]. A former member of the Stalinist organization – 
any biographical details or circumstances are for people posting such 
statements completely irrelevant – represents not only the organization 
as such but also everything that is linked to it through chains of habit-
23 James G. Frazer, The golden bough: A study in magic and religion (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996)
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ual associations. One enemy supports the other one: “Kto pokazuje tego 
żydowskiego zbrodniarza, który zabijał Polaków, tylko niemiecko faszystowski 
ŁONET” [“Who shows the Jewish criminal, who killed Poles? - Only 
German-fascist Onet”]. No red lines apply. Some posts are extremely 
disgusting and are a result of trolling due to the fact they are repeated 
noticeably often in not comparable contexts. Nevertheless, within mag-
ical thinking, it is possible to reason as follows: If an information portal 
owned by Germans (associated with Nazis) “promotes” Jews, they con-
spire against Poland together – as two reified communities, as two col-
lective subjects. Even those who disagree can assume Poland has some 
“hidden” enemies: “Wrogiem Polski nie Żydzi są… tylko organizacja Opus 
Dei!” [“Poland’s enemies are not the Jews… it is solely the organization 
Opus Dei!”]. Associative thinking makes possible “jumps” from one top-
ic to another if we remind that in the addressed article the word Polish or 
any of its derivates were not even mentioned.
Such thinking can be regarded as a collective habitus reproduced in 
some right-wing social networks. It is a learned manner of perceiving 
and thinking and it is a result of “hot”, highly aestheticized (i.a. iconized) 
and rhetorized social media discourses which inhibit analytical (“cold”) 
perception and thinking. It can be considered as a symptom of folkloriza-
tion of the public sphere.
Within magical-mythical perception and thinking, due to chains of 
associative links, everything can have something in common with ev-
erything, no binding distinctions occur. The difference between good and 
bad, the Own and the Other is here a question of situational context. Our 
enemies can threaten at the same time our ethnicity, our national cul-
ture, European culture, Christianity, Western civilisation or the civilised 
world. Folklorized nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe can be 
at the same time related to everything. The situational context decides, 
who is our companion and who our enemy. The criteria of the difference 
between the Own and the Other can vary significantly. Sometimes blood 
and soil function as a crucial distinctive criterion, sometimes it is “our 
culture”, “our values”, “European values” or “Christian values”.
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In the frame of magical indistinctiveness, there is no need for consis-
tency. Folklorized nationalism discourses are not a sphere where incon-
sistencies, contradictions or other paradoxes could be visible or prob-
lematized. They are a part of everyday knowledge. A shared nebulae 
of connotations (of vague interconnected images) enabled to avoid any 
clear definitions and any clarifications of obvious notions.
Roland Barthes shows in his essay The African grammar that especially 
words functioning as empty signifiers can affect peoples’ emotions24. In 
a similar way, Ernesto Laclau, Noam Chomsky or Edward S. Herman 
claim a notion can undisturbedly function as a rhetoric tool if it is vacu-
ous, if it has no clear meaning. The meaning of such a notion is always 
actualized by the context25. The famous slogan Make America great again! 
has enormous persuasive power because it means nothing specific, it 
has no specific denotation. It only matches and activates connotations 
relating to splendid and desirable things. The slogan reminds Americans 
of prosperity, power, the founding fathers of the country and their ide-
als – of everything valuable. That is why notions like “national values”, 
“Christian values”, “European values” etc. are so popular within folk-
lorized nationalism. They can function as instruments of manipulation 
and persuasion only as long as they are not defined – as long as they 
function as empty signifiers. Only under such conditions, it is possible to 
protect “Christian values” or pretend to do so while ignoring at the same 
time New Testament ethics. (Christianity without New Testament ethics 
could even remind of Slavoj Žižek´s examples of products deprived of 
their difficult property: coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, beer 
without alcohol etc.). Magic-mythical perception makes paradoxes invis-
ible – it creates a unity of phenomena.
24 Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and other mythologies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 103-109. 
25 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Why do empty signifiers matter to politics?’ in Emancipation(s), 
(London: Verso Books, 1996), 36-46; Noam Chomsky, Media control: The spec-
tacular achievments of propaganda (New York. Stories, 1997), 20-23; Edward S. 
Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing consent: The political economy of 
the mass media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 30-35.
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In summary, new nationalism as folklorized nationalism is a symp-
tom of the culture of trolling. Such a culture is characterized by the 
hypertrophy of rhetoric strategies. It is characterized by unscrupulous 
manipulation techniques regardless of any long-term consequences for 
society. New nationalisms can be defined as a result of the decline of 
the hierarchies of knowledge credibility. Trolling means mystifying our 
interlocutors by sowing discord among them, provoking quarrels by 
sending inflammatory messages, manipulating discussed topics, mak-
ing any consensus impossible to achieve, distracting them, etc. Trolling 
inflames people’s emotions and thus destroys formally correct conclud-
ing. It promotes magical-mythical perceiving and thinking. Trolls wake 
strong emotions among their interlocutors, make them think “too quick-
ly” under the influence of developed effects. They make them focus not 
on primary topics but on secondary inflammable matters associated with 
these topics. Trolls are able to divert peoples´ attention from a significant 
topic to another, not a significant one. They disrupt constructive, on-top-
ic discussions and induce effective or even irrational reactions of their 
interlocutors. What is crucial, trolling presumes practically the same dis-
cursive strategies, persuasion, and manipulation techniques which are 
present elsewhere in the frame of contemporary neoliberal public dis-
courses.
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